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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for a single count of lewd and lascivious
conduct with a minor in violation ofI.C. § 18-1508 with an enhancement pursuant to I.e. § 192520G. R Vol. II 399-407. The conviction should be reversed because irrelevant hearsay
testimony was improperly admitted over objection and because IRE 404(b) evidence was
improperly admitted at trial. In the alternative, the conviction should be reversed on the basis of
cumulative error.
B. Procedural History
Appellant Jonathan Folk was charged by information with a single count oflewd conduct
as follows:
That the defendant, Jonathan Earl Folk, on or about December 25,2007, in the
County of Bonneville, Sate ofIdaho, did commit a lewd and lascivious act upon
the body of a minor, a child under the age of sixteen, namely, T.R. (8/30/02), five
(5) years old, by oral-to-genital contact with T.R., with the intent to gratifY the
sexual desire of Jonathan Earl Folk. (Up to life, $50,000 fine, $5,000
compensatory fine + restitution).
R 36244.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, wherein Mr. Folk represented himself. A conviction
was obtained, but was later vacated by the Supreme Court based upon constitutional and
instructional errors. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735 (2011). (By its order of February
6,2012, this Court has augmented the appellate record in this case with the Court File,
Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in the prior appeal, No. 36244.)
The case returned to the district court and a second trial was held. Mr. Folk again

represented himself. Tr. 9/7111, p. 48, In. 12-21. The second trial ended in a conviction and Mr.
Folk was sentenced to a term of fixed life. R Vol. II 399-401.
This appeal timely follows. R Vol. II 404-407.
C. Statement of Facts
The state's case against Mr. Folk consisted of witness testimony of varying degrees of
reliability and consistency and evidence of two prior Illinois sex offense convictions involving
children.
Charity Reed testified that on Christmas Day, 2007, Mr. Folk arrived at the house she
shared with her husband, three children, and grandmother, Mildred Derka, in Idaho Falls. Trial
Tr. p. 177, In. 9-16, p. 185, In. 14-16. April Prock and her children were also living there. Trial
Tr. p. 178, In. 19-25. According to Ms. Reed, prior to Mr. Folk's arrival, all the regular residents
and several other people were already at the house, including Ms. Reed's cousin Don Briggs, his
children, and Ms. Derka's sister's stepson, Blaine Blair. Mr. Blair had been there for about a
week, and this had caused Ms. Reed concern because he is a registered sex offender. Trial Tr. p.
179, In. 17-22, p. 182, In. 16-p. 183, In. 19. Ms. Reed testified that she repeatedly told Ms.
Derka that she did not want Mr. Blair in the house, she made sure that he was never alone with
the children, and she prevented the children from sitting on his lap. Trial Tr. p. 235, In. 12-p.
236, In. 1, p. 237, In. 21-p. 238, In. 8. 1
Mr. Blair testified that he lived in an independent group home in Boise. Trial Tr. p. 441,
In. 17-20. Although evidence was not provided as to Mr. Blair's reason for living in a group

I Ms. Derka testified to the contrary that Ms. Reed never voiced any concerns to her.
Trial Tr. p. 416, In. 8-13.
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home, Mr. Blair did testify, "my memory's not very good memory as it is that I have a hard time
remembering 'cause my - 'cause the medication I take." Trial Tr. p. 553, In. 18-20. In his
closing, Mr. Folk stated, without objection from the state, "You may have noticed Blaine's not of
a, of a normal person. He's got medication problems as far as - as well as mental problems."
Trial Tr. p. 644, In. 23-25.
Mr. Blair testified that he had been convicted of two counts oflewd and lascivious
behavior in 1985, and then in 2000 was again "victed" "on flashing children." Trial Tr. p. 442,
In. 19-p. 443, In. 22.
In addition to being related to Ms. Derka and Ms. Reed, Mr. Blair was related to Mr. Folk
and Mr. Folk had stayed with Mr. Blair in Boise for a short time before Christmas 2007. Trial
Tr. p. 442, In. 2-15. During that time, Mr. Folk got Mr. Blair ajob walking picket lines and
holding banners for a union in Boise. Trial Tr. p. 545, In. 3-p. 548, In. 8. And, Mr. Folk drove
Mr. Blair to Idaho Falls to spend Christmas with Ms. Derka. Trial Tr. p. 445, In. 18-p. 445, In. 4.
Mr. Blair testified that he had spoken some with Mr. Folk and Mr. Folk told him that he
(Mr. Folk) did not want to stop "busing" kids. Trial Tr. p. 445, In. 1-2. However, when Mr.
Blair was interviewed by police at the time of the alleged offense in this case, he stated the
opposite - that Mr. Folk told him several times prior to the trip to Idaho Falls that "he was quit"
having sexual contact with children. Trial Tr. p. 459, In. I-p. 467, In. 12.
Mr. Folk did not stay at the Reed/Derka house. However, he did come to the house on
Christmas to pick up Mr. Blair to drive back to Boise. Trial, Tr. p. 186, In. 19-20. Before Mr.
Folk arrived at the house, Ms. Reed received a telephone call from James Potts who is the
boyfriend of Carrie Briggs and the ex-husband ofMr. Folk's sister Jeanette. Carrie Briggs is
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Don Brigg's ex-wife and one of Ms. Reed's best friends. Don was at the Reed/Derka house with
his and Carrie's children. Trial Tr. p. 179, In. 19-24, p. 521, In. 13-p. 522, In. 17, p. 238, In. 1224.
Mr. Reed testified that he was in the garage when Ms. Reed came out to tell him about
the telephone call. Regarding the call and Ms. Reed's report of it, Mr. Reed testified, "I was
blown away because the emotions that Charity was going through at the time." '''Cause we were,
we were watching Blaine. And we turned around, and it was you [Mr. Folk] that we had - it was
Jonathan that we had to worry about." Trial Tr. p. 526, In. 17-p. 527, In. 7.
Contrary to her husband's account, Ms. Reed testified that she received the call before
Mr. Folk arrived at the house, but that she did not tell her husband about it. Trial Tr. p. 529, In.
16-p. 530, In. 11.
Mid-afternoon, Carrie Briggs called Don Briggs and asked him to bring their children to
her. Ms. Reed drove Mr. Briggs and his children to Ms. Briggs'. When she returned, Mr. Folk
was there to pick up Mr. Blair. Trial Tr. p. 184, In. 6-p. 186, In. 20.
Ms. Reed went into the kitchen to hurry dinner along so that Mr. Blair and Mr. Folk could
leave before a storm arrived. Trial Tr. p. 187, In. 19-23. About 10-15 minutes later, she saw that
her son, five-year-old T.R., was no longer in the living room and she went into his bedroom
looking for him. She saw T.R. laying on the bed on his back with his legs sprawled open like a
triangle and Mr. Folk kneeling between T.R.'s legs with Mr. Folk's hands on T.R.'s hips. Trial
Tr. p. 188, In. 2-25.
Ms. Reed testified that she heard T.R. say "Ooh, gross," and she asked what they were
doing. Both Mr. Folk and T.R. said that they were just playing and, in fact, T.R. was laughing.
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Ms. Reed testified that Mr. Folk moved away from T.R. and T.R. went right to Ms. Reed. Ms.
Reed sat down on the floor to help T.R. pick up toys and Mr. Folk stood off in the comer and
then left the room. Ms. Reed testified that she again asked T.R. what he had been doing when
she came in the room, and T.R. said again that they had been playing. Then, Mr. Folk came into
the room again along with the other kids in the house. So, Ms. Reed took all the children into the
living room. Trial Tr. p. 189, In. I-p. 192, In. 16.
At some point in all this, Mr. Folk picked up T.R. and held him upside down while T.R.
picked toys up from the floor to clean the room. Trial Tr. p. 224, In. 6-p. 225, In. 4. Ms. Reed
testified that T.R. was trying to get down while this happened, Trial Tr. p. 224, In. 17-18, but
T.R. testified that he was having fun and laughing while Mr. Folk carried him around. Trial Tr.
p. 372, In. 3-10.
Ms. Reed testified that she did not see Mr. Folk engage in any illegal or immoral
behavior. Ms. Reed did not hear Mr. Folk tell T.R. not to tell or anything like that, and she did
not see any signs of sexual activity or coercion or any efforts to hide any sexual activity. Also,
Ms. Reed did not observe T.R. scream in fear or cry with regard to Mr. Folk. Trial Tr. p. 244, In.
9-11; p. 245, In. 14-p. 246, In. 6, p. 248, In. I-p. 249, In. 15.
Nevertheless, Ms. Reed also testified that she told Ms. Prock that day that she had a
feeling that something bad had happened, but that she did not know what it was. Trial Tr. p. 192,
In. 17-24.
Ms. Reed testified that she noticed that when Mr. Folk and Mr. Blair left the house, Mr.
Folk gave T.R. change and some candy, but did not give anything to any of the other children.
Trial Tr. p. 195, In. 2-15.
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Ms. Reed testified that T.R. was unusually shy and clingy the rest of the evening. Trial
Tr. p. 196, In. 12-20. Then, about 3 :00 a.m., he woke her. The next day she called her service
coordinator through the Family Resource Center who referred her to the police. Trial Tr. p. 197,
In. 20 - p. 199, In. 10.
When Mr. Folk was arrested a few days later, Ms. Reed told T.R. that the guy that hurt
him was in jail. Trial Tr. p. 233, In. 11-19.
Ms. Reed testified that "[I]t's hard to remember everything - from four years ago." Trial
Tr. p. 193, In. 25-p. 194, In. 2.
Officer Sauer of the Idaho Falls police testified that he went to the ReedlDerka house on
December 26,2007, and Ms. Reed told him that when she questioned T.R. about whether Mr.
Folk had touched him "down there," T.R. nodded yes and put the tip of his sippy cup in his
mouth and popped it back out. Trial Tr. p. 276, In. 5-19.
On January 2,2008, Detective (now Sergeant) Galbreaith of the Idaho Falls police
attempted to locate Mr. Folk. Someone at Mr. Blair's house told the sergeant that Mr. Folk was
in Arizona. And, officials in Arizona confirmed that as of January 4,2008, Mr. Folk was
registered with the state as a sex offender residing at a specific location in Phoenix. Trial Tr. p.
295, In. 4-p. 297, In. 19.
At the second trial, T.R. testified that he and Mr. Folk cleaned up some toys and then
went into T.R. 's bedroom where "well, he molested me." He described the molestation as "he
sucked on my private area" while T.R. was on the bed. Trial Tr. p. 336, In. 1-25.
When the prosecutor asked T.R. ifhe knew of any other word for private area, he said
that he did not and that he has never heard anyone use any word besides "private area." Trial Tr.
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p. 337, In. 10-p. 338, In. 3. (At the previous trial, T.R. had referred to his penis as his "pee-pee."
Trial Tr. p. 352, In. 23-24.)
T.R. testified at the second trial that all Mr. Folk did was suck and that T.R. did not say
anything to him. Trial Tr. p. 338, In. I7-p. 339, In. 14. T.R. also testified that his mother was in
the room before this happened and she just stayed there by the door but he does not know if she
saw what happened. Trial Tr. p. 340, In. 5-p. 341, In. 8. He testified in conflict with his
mother's testimony that she did not ask what they were doing. Trial Tr. p. 342, In. 18-25.
Mr. Folk impeached T.R. with his many varying and contradictory accounts of the alleged
event. For example, when T.R. was originally interviewed by Detective Galbreaith he first told
the detective that he and Mr. Folk were playing and that Mr. Folk accidentally "did it." Then, he
said that Mr. Folk had not touched him. Trial Tr. p. 347, In. lI-p. 346, In. 3. Then, T.R. said
that Mr. Folk opened his mouth, shut it, and bit his private area leaving a mark. Trial Tr. p. 348,
In. 22-p. 349, In. 4.
At the preliminary hearing T.R. testified that there had been a popping sound and that Mr.
Folk had touched him with only his mouth, not his hands. Trial Tr. p. 351, In. I1-p. 352, In. 5.
At the first trial T.R. testified that Mr. Folk did not see his "pee-pee." Trial Tr. p. 352, In.
9-25. He also testified that Mr. Folk had covered his mouth when he tried to yell for his mother.
Trial Tr. p. 355, In. 20-p. 356, In. 7. He also testified that he could not remember Mr. Folk being
in his bedroom or even at the house. Trial Tr. p. 357, In. 23-p. 358, In. 12. And, he testified that
he was on the floor when Mr. Folk put his mouth on him. Trial Tr. p. 380, In. 1-16.
T.R. was also interviewed at Help Inc., about six months before the second trial. Trial Tr.
p. 361, In. 11-20. However, just six months later, at the trial, nine-year-old T.R. could not
7

remember having been to Help Inc. Trial Tr. p. 333, In. 2; p. 357, In. 4-23. During the forgotten
interview, T.R. said that his mother came in and saw what was happening and told Mr. Folk,
"Get out of this house right now." Trial Tr. p. 363, In. 1-5. T.R. also said during this same
interview both that his mother saw and that his mother did not see Mr. Folk put his mouth on his
private. Trial Tr. p. 366, In. 5-20.
During the interview at Help, T.R. also said that Mr. Folk said, "[J]ust let me rub it."
Trial Tr. p. 367, In. 7-13. T.R. also said that he cried and ran away and Mr. Folk chased him.
Trial Tr. p. 368, In. 10-14. T.R. also reported in the interview that he said to Mr. Folk, "Dude,
get off now. I need to go to the bathroom," that he "peed" in Mr. Folk's mouth, and that he and
his mother then saw Mr. Folk out in the back yard "puking." Trial Tr. p. 369, In. I-p. 370, In. 8.
Also in the Help interview, T.R. said that Mr. Folk had tried to listen to T.R. 's private
with his ear. Trial Tr. p. 370, In. 17-p. 371, In. 1.
T.R. also gave varying accounts of Mr. Folk's history. He said that Mr. Folk had told him
that he had done this to hundreds of kids and then he said that actually Mr. Folk did not tell him
that, but his mother did. Trial Tr. p. 382, In. 4-p. 383, In. 4.
In addition to the above testimony, the state presented over objection Ms. Reed's
testimony that T.R. awoke her early in the morning on December 26, saying that he had had a
nightmare about "what that bad guy did to him the night before." Ms. Reed further testified that
when she asked who the bad guy was T.R. replied "Jon, Jonathan." Trial Tr. p. 197, In. 20-p.
198, In. 5.
The state also presented evidence over objection of two prior convictions. Trial Tr. p.
428, In. I-p. 437, In. 23; p. 483, In. II-p. 492, In. 15. Evidence of the first conviction consisted
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of the testimony of now 24-year-old Matthew Prendergast accompanied by a photograph of him
at age four or five. Trial Tr. p. 428, In. I-p. 437, In. 23. Evidence of the second conviction
consisted of the testimony of Antonette Redmond accompanied by a photograph of her son as he
appeared at age four. Trial Tr. p. 483, In. Il-p. 492, In. 15.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Were hearsay statements regarding a nightmare and what allegedly happened the day
prior to the nightmare improperly admitted?
2. Were prior convictions improperly admitted under IRE 404(b) when the only
probative value of the convictions was as propensity evidence?
3. Does the doctrine of cumulative error require reveresal?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Statements Regarding T.R.'s Nightmare and What Allegedly Happened the
Day Before Were Improperly Admitted

1. Facts Relevant to Issue
Prior to trial, Mr. Folk filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding why Ms.
Reed called the police. In particular, Mr. Folk sought to exclude Ms. Reed's testimony that T.R.
told her that he had had a nightmare about "what that bad guy did to me last night." Mr. Folk,
citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007), argued that the testimony should be
excluded because it was not relevant. R Vol. I, pp. 67-72.
In response, the state filed a memorandum in opposition in which it argued that the
motion in limine was premature and the question should be settled at trial, and that the testimony
about the nightmare was relevant because it was necessary to put the other facts of the case in
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context. R Vol. I, pp. 95-97.
Mr. Folk filed a response to the state memorandum arguing that the motion was not
premature because admission of the testimony would be improper and to force him to wait until
the evidence was produced before the jury and then object would result in a miscarriage of justice
as the jury would have then already heard the improper evidence. Mr. Folk also reiterated that
the evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant as held in Field, supra. He also argued
that the evidence should be excluded because it is not "competent" citing State v. Christiansen,
144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007). R Vol. I, pp. 100-102.
The district court ruled that T .R. ' s statements to his mother were not admissible in order
to put the other facts of the case in context. The court stated, "However in order to be
admissible, the exact statements which prompted Charity to call the police must be relevant." R
Vol. II p. 297. The court held that Ms. Reed's general recollection of the fact ofa nightmare
without recitation of what the nightmare was about was sufficient to provide context. R Vol. II,
p.298.
However, the court further held that T.R.'s statement to his mother that he had had a
nightmare "about what that guy did to me last night," was admissible as an excited utterance.
The court noted that the startling event for excited utterance purposes was the nightmare. R Vol.
II, p. 298-299.

At the trial, the state elicited the following testimony from Ms. Reed regarding the
nightmare:
He said that he'd had a nightmare, and I asked him what about. And he says
told me that it was about what that bad guy did to him the night before.
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And I asked him, "What bad guy?"
And he said, "Jon, Jonathan."

I asked him what Johnny had done to him, and at first he wouldn't tell me. He'd

just stick his head in my side and you know, wouldn't say much.
Trial Tr. p. 197, In. 25-p. 198, In. 9.
Ms. Reed continued her testimony stating that after this exchange she remained awake
until morning when she called her service coordinator. Trial Tr., p. 199, In. 1-8.
2. Standard ofReview
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a
mixed standard of review. First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of
law that is subject to free review. Second, we review the district court's
determination of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion. We determine whether the district
court abused its discretion by examining: (1) whether the court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal standards;
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason ....
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582,590 (2010) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted.)
The admissibility of a statement pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Field, 144 Idaho at 567-68, 165 P.3d at 28182.
The inquiry for harmless error is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury
would have convicted even without the admission of the improper evidence. State v. Johnson,
148 Idaho 664, 670, 227 P.3d 918,924 (2010), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S 18,24,87
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S.Ct. 824, 828 (1967). See also, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,974 (2008), " .
. . Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman harmless error test to all objected-to
error."

3. Argument
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." IRE 402. '''Relevant Evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." IRE 401.
In this case, the district court correctly held, in accord with State v. Field, 144 Idaho at
281, 165 P.3d at 567, that T.R.'s statements to Ms. Reed were not admissible on the basis that
they were not offered as hearsay, but only to demonstrate the effect on Ms. Reed. As was the
case in Field, the state could not show in Mr. Folk's case that the exact statements prompting
Ms. Reed to call the police are relevant - that is of consequence to determining whether Mr.
Folk's guilt was more or less probable. IRE 402.
In this case, however, the district court found that the statements were admissible as
excited utterances prompted by the nightmare. R Vol. II, p. 298-99. The district court
concluded:
Considered as a whole, T.J's [sic] age, the nightmare, and the occurrence which
lead up to it leave this Court with the abiding conviction that T.l.'s [sic] response
to Charity'S question was not the result of reflective thought, but an excited
utterance about the nightmare he had just experienced. As such, it is admissible
into evidence. Therefore, Folk's Motion to exclude Mother's Testimony shall be
denied.
R Vol. II, p. 299.
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This conclusion is erroneous. Field is controlling.
In Field, as a fall back position, the state argued that the hearsay statements not
admissible to prove why the mother contacted the police were admissible as excited utterances.
As set out in Field:
Statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule when the statements 'relat[e] to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of the
excitement caused by the event or condition.' IRE 803(2). The exception has two
f€~quirements: (1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render
inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the
statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the
occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought. We consider the
totality of the circumstances including: 'the amount of time that elapsed between
the startling event and the statement, the nature of the condition or event, the age
and condition of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest, and
whether the statement was volunteered or made in response to a question.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho at 568, 165 P.3d at 282 (citations omitted).
In Field, hearsay statements of a child about alleged sexual assault were held inadmissible

as excited utterances given that two days had passed between the incident and the statements, the
statements were not volunteered and the child's initial refusal to speak about the incident to her
sister tended to show that when she did finally speak, the statements were the result of reflective
thought.
In this case, as in Field, the state alleged sexual assault, which, if it occurred would have
been a startling event. ld. And, a nightmare is a startling event.
However, T.R.' s statements about the content of his dream are not probative of whether
the events in the dream actually happened. Rather, what could be found probative was T.R.'s
hearsay that the bad man did something to him the night before and that the bad man was Mr.
Folk. However, that hearsay is hearsay, not about the dream, but about the events of the day
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before the dream.
Considering the hearsay about the day before, the situation is analogous to that in Field
As in Field, the hearsay was from a child and the hearsay was about an event that happened some
time in the past (here about 12 hours, in Field 48 hours). As in Field, the statements were not
volunteered, but made in response to questioning (Ms. Reed asked T.R. both what the dream was
about and who the bad guy was), and as in Field, the child had initially refused to speak about the
incident. (In Field, the child at first stated that she did not want to say what had happened, and
then later stated that she had been touched. In this case, T.R. did not refuse to speak; rather, at
the time ofthe alleged incident, he told his mother that he and Mr. Folk had been playing and
then after the nightmare, he refused to answer further questions, burying his head in his mother's
side.)
In Field, the Supreme Court found that the statements did not fall within the excited
utterance exception. In this case, also, the statements that a bad guy had done something and that
the bad guy was Mr. Folk were not excited utterances - time had passed, the statements were
made in response to questioning, and T.R. had originally stated that he and Mr. Folk were just
playing. These circumstances show that when T.R. did make the accusatory statements, they
were the result of a reflective thought and thus were not admissible under IRE 803(2).
Given the evidence was improperly admitted, the question of whether the error was
hannless must be considered. Reviewing the evidence presented at the second trial, it cannot be
said beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted even without the
admission of the improper evidence. Chapman v. California, supra; State v. Perry, supra.
The state's evidence of guilt was primarily Ms. Reed's and T.R.'s testimony. Although
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Ms. Reed testified that she saw TR. on the bed with Mr. Folk kneeling in front of him, she also
testified that she did not see any sexual activity or attempt to hide sexual activity.
At the same time, TR.'s testimony was of limited probative value. T.R. was simply not
a coherent and thus credible witness. In fact, he appeared to be nearly incompetent as a witness.
Doubts about T.R.'s competency are raised by much of his testimony including testimony
that indicated that he simply did not have a reliable memory for anything. Consider that just six
months before his testimony in the second trial, he was interviewed at Help, Inc., yet at the trial,
he claimed he could not remember ever having been there. Trial Tr. p. 359, In. 3-23. Consider
that at nine years old TR. testified that he was unaware of any name for male genitals other than
"private area." Trial Tr. p. 337, In. 10-p. 338, In. 3.
And, doubts about TR.' s credibility were raised by his statements, actions, and
testimony which were highly inconsistent. At the time of the alleged abuse, T.R. when asked
directly what he had been doing laughed and said he was playing. Trial Tr. p. 189, In. 5-12.
Immediately asked a second time by his mother what he had been doing, T.R. again said that he
had been playing. Trial Tr. p. 191, In. 14-16.
Later that night, after the nightmare, TR. refused to answer questions save for saying his
nightmare had been about what Mr. Folk had done to him. Instead of responding to further
questioning, he just buried his head in his mother's side. Trial Tr. p. 198, In. 7-p. 199, In. 8.
According to Officer Sauer, Ms. Reed told him that sometime after T.R. refused to
answer questions, she again asked what Mr. Folk had done, and TR. put the tip of a sippy cup in
his mouth and popped it back out. The officer also testified that Ms. Reed said that TR. had
answered "yes" when she asked him if "that guy" had put T.R.'s private in his mouth. Trial Tr.
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p. 279, In. 1-13.
But, shortly later, when he was interviewed by Detective Galbreaith, T.R. stated that Mr.
Folk had not touched him. Trial Tr. p. 345, In. 25-p. 346, In. 2. He also, in the same interview
told the detective that he and Mr. Folk were playing and Mr. Folk accidently "did it" although he
could not remember what he meant by saying "did it." Trial Tr. p. 346, In. 19-16.
A bit later in the interview with the detective, T.R. stated that Mr. Folk opened his mouth,
shut it, put his teeth on "it" and left a mark. Trial Tr. p. 348, In. 22-24.
At the preliminary hearing, T.R. testified that Mr. Folk had covered his (T.R.'s) mouth.
Trial Tr. p. 350, In. 21-23. Ms. Reed never testified that she saw Mr. Folk cover T.R. 's mouth.
Also at the preliminary hearing, T.R. testified that Mr. Folk had not touched him with his
hands. Trial Tr. p. 351, In. 15-p. 352, In. 4. T.R. also testified at that hearing that neither he nor
Mr. Folk saw one another's "peepee." Trial Tr. p. 352, In. 22-p. 353, In. 2.
At the first trial, T.R. testified that his mother came into the bedroom, then left and went
into the bathroom and by the time she returned Mr. Folk was gone. Trial Tr. p. 354, In. 7-p. 355,
In. 5. T.R. also testified that he could not remember sitting on his bed while Mr. Folk was in his
room, that he could not remember Mr. Folk being in his room, and that he could not remember
the day Mr. Folk was at his house. T.R. also testified at the trial that he could not remember
saying that Mr. Folk put his mouth on his peepee and that he could not remember Mr. Folk
putting his mouth on his peepee. Trial Tr. p. 357, In. 10-p. 359, In. 3.
Also at the first trial, T.R. testified that he never told his mother about his nightmare.
Trial If. p. 376, In. 16-24. He also testified that he could not remember what the nightmare had
been about. Trial Tr. p. 377, In. 5-14.
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And, in the first trial, T.R. testified that he was lying on the floor, not the bed, when Mr.
Folk touched him. Trial Tr. p. 379, In. I-p. 380, In. II.
After the first trial, about six months before the second trial, T.R. was interviewed at Help
Incorporated. However, at the second trial, T.R. said he could not remember this interview.
Trial Tr. p. 359, In. 4-23.
At Help, T.R. said that he had yelled for his mother who was in the bathroom. T.R. said
she responded, came into the bedroom, and told Mr. Folk to "get out of this house right now."
Trial Tr. p. 363, In. I-p. 364, In. 22.
In a different part of his interview at Help, T.R. stated that his mother came in the room
and saw Mr. Folk's mouth on his penis. Then he said, "No, actually she didn't." Trial Tr. p.
366, In. 11-20.
T.R. also said in the Help interview that prior to Mr. Folk pulling down his pants, Mr.
Folk said, "Just let me rub it." Trial Tr. p. 366, In. 21-p. 367, In. 13.
T.R. also claimed at Help that he had peed in Mr. Folk's mouth. Trial Tr. p. 367, In. 1416. T.R. said that after this, he and his mother watched Mr. Folk in their backyard "puking" from
the pee. Trial Tr. p. 369, In. 9-p. 370, In. 8.
At that same interview, T.R. said that while Mr. Folk was sucking on him he said, "Dude,
get off now. I need to go to the bathroom." T.R. also stated that he started to cry and Mr. Folk
started to chase him. Trial Tr. p. 368, In. 6-14.
And, at the Help interview, T.R. said that Mr. Folk tried to listen to his private area. Trial
Tr. p. 370, In. 17-p. 371, In. 1.
At the first trial, T.R. testified that he had no pants with zippers. At Help, T.R. said that
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Mr. Folk had pulled up his pants and zipped them as his mother came into the room and T.R.
immediately said to his mother, "Mom, he molested me." Trial Tr. p. 374, In. 5-21.
At the second trial, T.R. testified that his mother was in the bedroom standing by the door
while Mr. Folk was sucking on his private, but he did not know if she saw what happened. T.R.
also testified that immediately after he "dead ran to my mom" and sat on her lap and hugged her
as hard as he could. Trial Tr. p. 341, In. 1-18.
T.R. also testified at the second trial that Mr. Folk had helped him with his boots when
his feet got wet from playing in the snow and that his mother was standing close by when this
happened. Trial Tr. p. 372, In. 1-25; p. 374, In. 22-p. 375, In. 5.
T.R.'s statements and testimony from Christmas 2007 until the end ofthe second trial in
2012 were extremely inconsistent. Oftentimes, they were simply contradictory. And, in many
instances, T.R.'s statements were directly in opposition to his mother's. She testified that he did
tell her about the dream and that she did not see Mr. Folk do anything sexual. She also never
claimed that she told Mr. Folk to leave the house or that she saw or heard T.R. cry, yell for her,
say anything to Mr. Folk or her, or run from Mr. Folk. And she never claimed to have watched
Mr. Folk "puke" in the yard.
Given the weakness in T.R.' s testimony and given that Ms. Reed testified that she did not
witness any wrongdoing - only that she witnessed Mr. Folk in a position that could have been as
consistent with innocent playas with sexual abuse, it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that without the improperly admitted hearsay, a rational jury would have found Mr. Folk
guilty. See State v. Coleman, 152 Idaho 872, 276 P.3d 744 eCt. App. 2012), holding that error in
admission of prior bad acts was not harmless where, as here, case rested almost entirely on the
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child's testimony; even though the child's testimony was sufficient to support a guilty verdict in

Coleman, the Court held that given the improperly admitted evidence, it could not say that it was
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's finding would not have been different absent the error.
Likewise in this case, even though some small part ofT.R.'s testimony might have supported a
conviction, the testimony taken as a whole was so contradictory and confused that it cannot be
said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would not have been different without the
inadmissible hearsay. Chapman, supra; Perry, supra; Coleman, supra.
B. Evidence of Prior Convictions Was Improperly Admitted

1. Facts Relevant to Issue
Prior to trial, Mr. Folk objected to the state's intended presentation of evidence of prior
convictions. R Vol. I, 46-54; 114-121. Following a hearing, the district court entered an order
allowing the evidence. R Vol. I, 169-183.
The evidence ultimately introduced at trial was of two prior convictions in Illinois. In
1992, Mr. Folk had been convicted of putting his mouth on the penis of a five-year-old boy, and
in 1999, Mr. Folk was convicted of putting his hands on the penis of a four-year-old boy. R 170.
At trial, the now-adult victim in the 1992 case testified that when he was four years old
his family was staying at a motel in Illinois. Mr. Folk was also staying at the motel and offered
to watch him while he played in the pool. Mr. Folk took the boy into the hot tub and repeatedly
pulled the boy's trunks down. Mr. Folk also pulled his own trunks down and bounced the boy on
his lap. Later Mr. Folk took the boy to his room and got him to remove his trunks. He then
photographed him. At a later time, Mr. Folk took the boy into the hot tub and put his mouth on
the boy's penis. The boy revealed these events to his mother about a year later and Mr. Folk was
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incarcerated as a result. Trial Tr. p. 429, In. 7-p. 435, In. 17. The state accompanied this
testimony with a photo of the witness as he appeared at age four or five. Trial Tr. p. 436, In. 2437, In. 24.
The mother of the victim in the 1999 case testified that she took her three children
including a four-year-old boy to a laundromat. Mr. Folk, whom she did not know, but who was
on parole, was also there. The children were playing while she attended to the washing. When
she looked over to see what they were doing she saw Mr. Folk pulling his hand out of the fouryear-old's pants. She called her children to her and the boy said that Mr. Folk had been feeling
his peepee. She went outside and called the police and Mr. Folk was arrested as he tried to run
away. This testimony was also accompanied by a photo of the victim taken near the time of the
offense. Trial Tr. p. 481, In. 13-p. 491, In. 10.
The district court held that the prior convictions were not to show preparation, common
scheme or plan, but were relevant to show motive, opportunity and intent and that the probative
value outweighed prejudicial effect. R 179-183.
2. Standard of Review

When determining the admissibility of evidence to which a Rule 404(b) objection
has been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is sufficient
evidence of the prior acts that a reasonable jury could believe the conduct actually
occurred. If so, then the court must consider: (1) whether the prior acts are relevant
to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity;
and (2) whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejUdice. [State v.] Grist, 147 Idaho [49,] 52,206 P.3d [1185,] 1188
[(2009)]; State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 P.3d 186, 190 eCt. App. 2009).
On appeal this Court defers to the trial court's determination that there is sufficient
evidence of the prior act if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence in
the record. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214,207 P.3d at 190 .... We exercise free
review, however, of the trial court's relevancy determination. State v. Sheldon, 145
Idaho 225,229, 178 P.3d 28, 32 (2008); State v. Schovell, 136 Idaho 587, 590, 38
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P.3d 625, 628 (Ct. App. 2001). The trial court's balancing of the probative value
of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice will not be disturbed unless
we find an abuse of discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190,254 P.3d 77,
91 (Ct. App. 2011).

State v, Coleman, 152 Idaho at 875, 276 P.3d at 747.
3. Argument
The district court correctly found that the prior offenses did not go to preparation or
common scheme or plan. With regard to preparation, the court noted that "Folk's prior
convictions and the uncharged allegations show no plan or intent with regard to TR. Instead,
Folk's alleged conduct with T.R. appears to be opportunistic, rather than a planned event." R
177.2 With regard to a common scheme or plan, the court noted that the prior offenses show
random acts against minors, both family members and strangers. The court stated, "Although
each of the complaining witnesses in the State's proposed 404(b) evidence was approximately the
same age and gender, and each incident involved the same or similar touching, the incidences are
not so related to the crime charged that one tends to establish the other." R 177-78.
However, the court did find that the prior convictions were relevant to prove motive,
opportunity and intent. R 175-77.
The court found that the prior convictions were relevant to prove motive because Mr.
Folk's defense rested upon an innocent motive for being in T.R.'s bedroom (to change TR.'s
socks) while the state maintained that the motive was criminal - to "detach" TR. from the adults
in the house and commit a sexual act. The court held that the evidence of the prior offenses

2 The state's 404(b) notice referred to allegations of abuse of a relative which never
resulted in a prosecution. However, at trial no evidence of those allegations was presented.
Augmented Record 404(b) Notice, filed stamped 8119111, and Memorandum in Support of Intent
to Use 404(b) Evidence of Prior Bad Acts by the Defendant at Trial, file stamped 8119111.
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tended to corroborate the state's allegations of a criminal motive. R Vol. I, p. 175.
The court also found that the prior convictions were relevant to prove opportunity because
Mr. Folk was alone with T.R. for just a few minutes. The court wrote that in the laundromat
incident Mr. Folk touched the child in the presence of the child's mother for "maybe two
minutes," citing the previous trial transcripts. The court concluded: "Such testimony tends to
corroborate the State's contention that Folk had the opportunity to molest T.R., even ifhe was
alone with the child for a very short time." R Vol. I, p. 175-76.
Lastly, the court concluded that the prior convictions were relevant to prove the specific
intent required to prove lewd conduct. The court wrote: "Evidence that Folk has been convicted
of sexually molesting young boys, and accused of molesting a child related to Folk, infers that
Folk did not intend innocent contact with T.R. when he entered T.R.'s bedroom alone with the
child." R Vol. I, p. 176.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person to show action in conformity therewith. IRE 404(b); Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at
283; Grist, 147 Idaho 52, 205 P .3d at 1188. Prior to Grist, some viewed the Idaho courts as

distinguishing child sex crime cases from other cases for purposes of IRE 404(b). Professor
Lewis commented in his treatise on Idaho trial practice that in sex crime cases the Idaho court
used a variety of rationales to justify admission of prior deviant sexual misconduct, including
admission on the issue of credibility, to corroborate the victim's testimony, to show plan or intent
and to show identity. The professor wrote: "Indeed, the evidence has been held to have been
properly admitted so often that it seems to constitute a special exception to the character evidence
prohibition." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook 2d Ed., §13:1 (2005), quoted in Grist, 147
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Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187.
But, in Grist, the Supreme Court reiterated its statement in Field that "there must be limits
to the use of bad acts evidence to show a common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases." 147
Idaho at 53, 205 P.3d at 1189, quoting Field, 144 Idaho at 570, 165 P.3d at 284. The Court stated,
"trial courts must carefully scrutinize evidence offered as 'corroboration' or as demonstrating a
'common scheme or plan' in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely
probative of the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior." 147 Idaho at 53, 205
P.3d at 1189.
The Grist Court then explained how this scrutiny was to be conducted. "[E]vidence
offered for the purpose of 'corroboration' must actually serve that purpose; the courts of this state
must not permit the introduction of impermissible propensity evidence merely by relabeling it as
'corroborative' or as evidence of a 'common scheme or plan.'" The Court concluded:
Although we can envision instances in which evidence of uncharged misconduct
will tend to reinforce the credibility of a witness without reliance on the
impermissible theory of the defendant's propensity to engage in such misconduct,
we will not attempt to identify all circumstances in which such evidence properly
may be admitted. Rather, we will identify the instance in which such evidence may
not be admitted: Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant
to IRE 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior.
147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190.
Rule 404(b) evidence must be admitted only when it serves the articulated permissible
purpose and not where it is merely propensity evidence "served up under a different name." 147
Idaho at 55, 205 P.3d at 1191.
Just a year later, in 2010, the Court again examined the scope of IRE 404(b). In State v.
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Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 227 P .3d 918 (2010), the Court held in a case charging lewd conduct

with the defendant's daughter, that the state could not introduce evidence ofthe defendant's
previous molestation of his younger sister. The Court wrote:
In other words, at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or plan
beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in the past.
The events must be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely
showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that
the same person committed all the acts.

148 Idaho at 668, 227 P.3d at 922.
In Johnson, the Court found that the facts that both alleged victims were seven to eight
years old, that both viewed Johnson as an authority figure, and that both involved him requesting
the victim to touch his penis were not so remarkable as to demonstrate a common scheme or plan.
Most recently in State v. Joy,

Idaho

P.3d

2013 WL 3185264, Slip Op.

June 25,2013, the Supreme Court found error in the admission of prior domestic violence and sex
abuse conduct toward the same victim as in the current prosecution for domestic battery, sexual
penetration by a foreign object, and second-degree kidnapping. The Court held that the prior
instances of domestic abuse which were similar and occurred close together in time were merely
suggestive of Joy's predisposition for domestic violence and thus were the sorts of character
evidence barred by Rule 404. Likewise, the evidence of prior sexual abuse, even though evidence
of similar conduct (anal rape), would tend to establish the charged forcible penetration only via
the impem1issible inference that "if he did it once, he probably did it again." Slip Op. at page 12.
In this case also, the prior convictions should not have been admitted under IRE 404(b)
because the probative value of the priors was entirely dependent upon their tendency to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior. Grist.
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The district court found that the prior offenses tended to prove that Mr. Folk acted with a
criminal motive in entering T.R.'s bedroom. A prior offense might be probative of motive in
certain circumstances. For example, proofthat a store had fired an employee for stealing might
later be probative of motive in a case charging the former employee with stalking the manager the prior offense explains why the employee engaged in the stalking. However, in this case the
only way the prior convictions would show a criminal motive in entering T.R.'s room was insofar
as the jury would draw the conclusion that because he had previously committed sexual
misconduct with young boys Mr. Folk intended to again commit a sex crime. This is an
impermissible use of prior bad acts evidence. Grist, supra; Johnson, supra; and Joy, supra.
The district court also found that the prior bad acts were probative of opportunity because
they showed that Mr. Folk could act quickly. The Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed the
opportunity basis for the admission of prior bad acts. However, McCormick states:
Other crimes sometimes are admissible to show that defendant had access to or
was present at the scene of the crime or possessed certain distinctive or unusual
skills or abilities employed in the commission of the crime charged. For example,
a defendant might be shown to have neutralized sophisticated burglar alarm
systems in other burglaries, to be a skilled shoplifter, or to know how to build pipe
bombs with 'a time delay and ... an explosive filler, igniter, power source, and
wiring.' Of course, the skill or knowledge must be rare if it is to possess enough
probative value to offer a meaningful alternative to propensity reasoning.
1 McCormick on Evid. § 190 (7th ed.), citations omitted, emphasis added.
Here the skill or knowledge involved - the ability to molest children quickly - is not rare.
Anyone not physically impaired can move quickly. The only way the prior offenses in this case
were probative of opportunity was via the impermissible inference of "if he did it once, he
probably did it again." Joy, supra.
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Lastly, the court reasoned that the prior offenses went to prove that Mr. Folk did not enter
T.R.'s bedroom with an innocent intent. Of course, the intent element oflewd conduct is the
specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of the
defendant, the child or a third party. I.C. § 18-1508. Intent is at issue in cases wherein the
defendant offers an innocent reason for the contact with the child. For example, in State v.
Bronson, 112 Idaho 367, 732 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1987), the defendant admitted manual/genital
contact with his daughter, but asserted that the contacts occurred as part of an education process to
teach his daughter about good and bad touches. See also, People v. Wilson, 824 N.E.2d 191(11l.
2005), wherein the defendant argued that ifhe had touched students' breasts it was simply
incidental contact and had no sexual purpose.
Mr. Folk's case was unlike those cases wherein intent is in question. Mr. Folk was
charged with oral-genital contact only. His defense was that no such contact occurred. He never
raised a defense that he had engaged in oral/genital conduct but that it was done without sexual
intent. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine any situation wherein oral-genital contact would
happen without sexual intent, for example as part of an education process or as simply incidental
and accidental contact. Intent was not really at issue in this case - ifthe state proved contact, it
proved intent.
Moreover, even assuming that intent was at issue - that the district court was correct that
the important intent element was Mr. Folk's intent when he walked into the bedroom - the prior
convictions are probative of intent at that moment only insofar as the impermissible inference is
drawn "ifhe did it once, he probably did it again." Because the probative value of the prior
offenses as to intent was entirely dependent upon the tendency of the priors to show propensity,
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the priors were not admissible under IRE 404(b). Grist, supra; Johnson, supra; Joy, supra.
The prior convictions were not probative of motive, opportunity, or intent - rather they
were inadmissible propensity evidence. The ruling to the contrary was erroneous.
Because the priors were not admissible, the district court should have never reached the
IRE 403 analysis. However, even assuming the court did not error in finding the priors to be
within the ambit of potentially admissible evidence, the court erred in its IRE 403 analysis.
The nature ofIRE 404(b) evidence is inherently prejudicial. Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho
223,241,233 P.3d 164, 172 (Ct. App. 2010). "In most cases the probative value will be
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]" Grist, 147 Idaho at 56, 205 P.3d at 1192, ftnt. 5,
Jones, J., specially concurring.
In this case, as discussed above, the priors were not probative. The district court
erroneously concluded otherwise. The district court then concluded that the prejudice of the prior
convictions was not great because Mr. Folk had admitted that he is a pedophile and that he wanted
to change his behavior, but that he also still thinks about molesting children. But, again, the court
was falling into the propensity problem - all of the admissions the court cited as negating the
prejudice of the priors were admissions that support a propensity conclusion - once a pedophile
who has offended, always a pedophile who offends. The existence of other propensity evidence
cannot be bootstrapped to make a claim that more propensity evidence is not unfairly prejudicial.
In fact, the admission of more propensity evidence suggests to the jury that convictions based
upon propensity evidence as opposed to evidence of the offense at hand are appropriate.
Just as with the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence, the error in admitting the
prior bad acts evidence is subject to a Chapman harmless error analysis. And, as discussed above,
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the weaknesses in the state's case preclude a finding that the error was hannless. It cannot be said
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would not have been different without the
erroneously admitted prior bad acts evidence. Chapman, supra; Perry, supra; Coleman, supra.
On this basis also, the conviction should be reversed.
C. Cumulative Error Requires Reversal
As set out above, reversal is required on the basis of each error - admission of inadmissible
hearsay, and admission of inadmissible other bad acts evidence - individually. In addition,
reversal is required under the doctrine of cumulative error.
The cumulative error doctrine "refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which
by itself might be hannless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial in
contravention of the defendant's constitution right to due process." State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809,
822,839 P.2d 1223, 1236 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). See also, State v. Ciccone, 154
Idaho 330, 343, 297 P.3d 1147, 1160 (Ct. App. 2012).
The state's case against Mr. Folk, absent the inadmissible hearsay and other bad acts
evidence, was not so strong that it can be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have convicted without the erroneously admitted evidence. Withoutthe improper
evidence, the jury would have had Ms. Reed's testimony which was that she did not see any
wrongdoing and T.R.' s statements and testimony which were inconsistent and often incoherent.
That evidence was not sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And, it certainly was
not of a quality that this Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have
voted to convict if errors had not been made.
On this basis also, reversal is required.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above - the erroneous admission of hearsay, the erroneous
admission of other bad acts evidence, and cumulative error - Mr. Folk asks that his conviction be
reversed.
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